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Abstract  
We address the general problem of selection bias, endemic to analyzing the 
effects of any policy where adoption is voluntary, with empirical application to 
environmental policies for agriculture. Many voluntary practices for mitigating 
the environmental impacts of agriculture provide external benefits while 
lowering productivity. Policy analysis of the productivity consequences is 
complicated by the fact that decision-makers can choose their own policy levers, 
an action that ruins any notion of random assignment. We introduce an 
identification strategy to correct this kind of endogeneity, combining classic 
methods from stochastic frontier analysis and selection models. Applying it to 
micro-level data from Finnish grain farms, we find that more efficient producers 
are more likely to enroll in subsidized practices. And, because these practices 
tend to reduce yield, frontier analysis without the endogeneity correction greatly 
understates productivity losses. In other words, naively basing the frontier 
estimator on the subset of less productive farms leads to downward bias in the 
resulting frontier estimates. In fact, average inefficiency more than doubles after 
the correction in this case. An outlier investigation also suggests that the lowest 
decile of farms are responsible for most of the selection bias in the uncorrected 
model. 
Key words: productivity, stochastic frontier analysis, endogeneity, selection 
model, agrienvironmental policy 
JEL classes: Q53, Q58, Q18, Q12, D24, C54, C34, C36  
 
 
1 Introduction
Agriculture is a significant source of non-point pollution in many countries. Because
these contaminants are difficult to regulate centrally (e.g., due to asymmetric informa-
tion), mitigation often relies on decentralized measures. In effect, farms are often handed
a set of pre-approved policy levers, and told to make the best possible outcome for them-
selves. Agri-environmental programs (AEPs), policies that subsidize voluntary adoption
of environmental practices, are an example of this approach.
Because many AEPs are inherently yield-reducing (e.g., fertilizer restrictions), they
present ambiguous welfare implications: environmental improvements can be offset by
productivity losses. To see the full welfare picture, policymakers need accurate estimates
of both facets. But, the fact that farms choose their own policy levers greatly complicates
any assessment of the productivity part. Choice from a menu patently violates bedrock
random-assignment assumptions used in empirical productivity analysis.
A farm facing a set of policy options will adopt only the ones that satisfy a cost-
benefit criterion particular to that farm. Consequently, AEP policy analysis should begin
by investigating this adoption step. If adoption is instead taken as given, the policy’s ef-
ficiency impact will be biased. To illustrate, consider an AEP menu with two options. A
farm will evaluate not only the overt incentives attached to each option (e.g., the subsidy
amount per area), but also how well each one integrates with the farm’s infrastructure
(e.g., the substitutability of crops across specific land tracts). Different farms can ra-
tionally come to different conclusions on the integration question, and choose differently
(and non-randomly) on that basis.
Suppose that a large fraction of farms adopt one practice – what does that say about
the productivity of the other? A naïve answer would simply note the first’s output
dominance, and declare the second inefficient on that basis. A more nuanced answer
would wrap the farm’s integration rationale into the output assessment, recognizing that
farms adopting the second policy do so from a reasoned appraisal of their own costs
and benefits. In this light, the selection of an uncommon practice is not an inherently
inefficient choice.
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To accommodate this and other selection stories, we develop a two-stage empirical
model of the productivity consequences of AEP adoption. The production stage is rooted
in stochastic frontier analysis (SFA) (Aigner et al., 1977), a method for estimating a
best-practices frontier of outputs for given inputs. SFA’s principal identifying restriction
decomposes the residual total factor productivity into explicitly nonnegative inefficiencies,
and all other unobservable productivity effects. Somewhat unusually, the quantity to be
identified is not a parameter, but the residual decomposition itself. Because moments
of the inefficiency term feed into widely-used efficiency indexes, measurements of this
residual have important practical ramifications (Kumbhakar and Lovell, 2000).
The adoption stage is rooted in classic selection models (Heckman, 1979). Framed as a
selection problem, AEP endogeneity arises because a farm assesses the potential inefficien-
cies across the menu when deciding which practices to adopt. Although the possibility of
inefficiency-based endogeneity is raised frequently in the productivity literature, most of
the endogeneity discussion to date has focused on simultaneity in production inputs. Am-
sler et al. (2016) compare the performance of various empirical strategies used to correct
this kind of endogeneity. Horrace et al. (2016) apply a polychotomous, Heckman-style
correction to a network production model that assigns workers to groups. We are aware
of only one other study that addresses endogenous technology choice in a policy context:
Kumbhakar et al. (2009) jointly estimate a dairy farm’s decision to go organic, and the
productivity consequences of those organic processes.
Our identification strategy enhances this last kind of endogeneity correction in two
ways. First, by using a multinomial framework, we can model more than two options
in the adoption stage, thereby addressing a broader spectrum of policies. Second, we
allow for arbitrary correlations among the inefficiency terms. This captures the fact that
a farm’s potential inefficiencies are probably grounded in common sources. For example,
an AEP menu of only fertilizer restrictions implicates similar farm processes involving
fertilizer.
To our knowledge, ours is the first empirical study to account for endogeneity of more
than two decision options within an SFA-style framework, while simultaneously allowing
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arbitrary inefficiency correlations. Our application has particular significance for policy
evaluation of AEPs in the US and EU, the areas with highest uptake of such programs.
But, this endogeneity correction is not limited to AEPs. It applies in generic situations
where a decision-maker evaluates a menu of technological options before proceeding to
production.
We estimate the model on a repeated cross-section of Finnish grain farms observed
during Finland’s third AEP policy period, 2007-2014. We find that correcting for adoption
endogeneity drastically alters the naïve efficiency assessment: among farms adopting an
AEP, average inefficiency more than doubles after the correction. Moreover, efficient
farms are more likely to select into AEPs.
Because the Finnish AEPs all tend to reduce yield, the latter finding carries worrisome
welfare implications. However, it may be driven by highly unproductive outliers. We find
that the relationship between uptake and efficiency fully inverts after removing the farms
in the lowest efficiency decile, a result more compatible with the likely policy objectives.
Because the model is highly nonlinear, we conduct a brief simulation study for intu-
ition about its asymptotics. A toy calibration indicates that the Central Limit Theorem
(CLT) applies only when sample sizes reach 103 to 104 observations. Unfortunately, even
when perfectly specified, models estimated on 102 observations tend to have flat sampling
distributions, particularly in the adoption stage. Thus, employing this method requires
substantial amounts of data. Fortunately, our application has about 5,000 observations,
making us relatively confident about the asymptotics in our case.
2 Policy Background
The EU’s Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) establishes EU-wide environmental ob-
jectives, but leaves policy design largely up to member states. The EU has historically
emphasized working-land AEPs, while the US has enacted them only recently (Baylis
et al., 2008). These practices often require major alterations to farm processes, raising
the specter of productivity losses. As AEPs expand in use, quantifying these productivity
consequences grows increasingly important.
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Finland provides an ideal case study of that tradeoff. More than 90% of Finnish
agricultural land is enrolled in some kind of AEP, compared to 25% across the fifteen
older EU members (European Commission, 2005). Finland also enrolls the most land –
about 95% in Finland versus 26% across the EU – in AEPs specifically requiring input
reduction. These practices entail sizeable productivity impacts.
Finland enacted its AEP policy upon joining the EU in 1995. Unlike the programs
of most member states, its program applies nationwide. Because the policy’s scope has
expanded significantly since its inception, we focus on Finland’s third AEP period, 2007-
2014. To ensure that we model a coherent technological space, we investigate only the
active farms that cultivated grain during that time.1
Finland’s policy has two participation levels: “basic measures” and “additional and/or
special measures.” For grain farms, basic measures for reducing nutrient loading impose
fertilizer limits by crop and region, and require 3 m filter strips for crops adjacent to
waterways. The “additional measures” and “special measures” (which require concurrent
enrollment in basic measures) include further reductions in fertilizer input, more accu-
rate application of fertilizer, reduced tillage, winter cover crops, long-term crop rotation,
nutrient balance, riparian zones, and organic processes. Subsidies vary by measure and
crop, and participation ranges from 10-30% for the additional and special measures.2
This variation in participation rates, coupled with farm-level detail on output, allows us
to empirically decompose the productivity consequences of adopting these AEPs.
This critical, first-order relationship has been largely unexplored in the literature.
As we noted previously, we know of only one other study (Kumbhakar et al., 2009)
that has actually corrected for inefficiency-based endogeneity, and only in the context
of binary uptake.3 The authors find that more inefficient dairy farms are less likely to
adopt organic practices, even though organic subsidies are available. Moreover, those
1In Finland, “active farms cultivating grain” include both crop farms with at least 1 ha under cultiva-
tion, and animal farms with at least 1 ha under cultivation or at least one animal being raised.
2The “Rural Development Programme for Mainland Finland 2007-2013” describes the eligibility cri-
teria, subsidy amounts, and participation rates. Basic-measure subsidies for crop farms are 93 EUR/ha,
and participation exceeds 90%. The non-binding character of the fertilizer limits may explain this very
high uptake rate (Laukkanen and Nauges, 2014).
3Some policy analysis of French agriculture has been conducted in this vein in the context of input
endogeneity, but outside the SFA literature (Piot-Lepetit and Moing, 2007; Mary, 2013).
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farms going organic are ultimately about 5% less efficient than those that do not, an
appreciable welfare tradeoff.
A few policy studies examine the efficiency of US and Canadian AEPs (Zhao et al.,
2004; Feng et al., 2006; Rabotyagov et al., 2010; Tamini et al., 2012). Tamini et al. (2012)
investigate the use of manure injection and herbicide reduction in Canadian crop farms.
Applying a dataset with farm and environmental outcomes, they estimate the “environ-
mental efficiency” of a farm’s decisions, along with productivity and profit. They find
that herbicide reductions decrease technical efficiency, but that the freed labor and capi-
tal also increase productivity. Manure injection slightly increases technical efficiency and
productivity, and substantially increases profitability. And, with regard to our core wel-
fare concern, the authors find a positive relationship between technical and environmental
efficiencies.
The literature on EU AEPs focuses almost exclusively on general efficacy and en-
vironmental outcomes (Ohl et al., 2008; Wätzold et al., 2008; Pufahl and Weiss, 2009;
Chabé-Ferret and Subervie, 2013; Laukkanen and Nauges, 2014). Laukkanen and Nauges
(2014) estimate input use exploiting regional differences in Finland’s AEP payments, and
simulate the resulting effects on nutrient loadings. They find that basic water-protection
measures, such as vegetative filter strips and winter cover crops, reduce nutrient loadings
by about 10%. Other aspects previously explored include farms’ participation decision
(Hynes et al., 2008; Giovanopoulou et al., 2011) and the spatial distribution of measures
(Wätzold and Drechsler, 2005; Bamière et al., 2011). We contribute to this stream of
research by estimating the productivity consequences of three of Finland’s most intensive
practices.
3 Correcting for Adoption Endogeneity
We introduce the model by describing the interlinked adoption and production decisions.
Each of I farms first chooses from a menu of J AEP practices, and then produces output
using the selected practice. Starting with the production step and working backward, farm
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i’s output under practice j is given by the log-linear Cobb-Douglas production model
yij = x
′
ijβj + εij
where yij is (log) output, xij is a (log) vector of observable input factors, and εij are
unobservable input factors. The unobservables are further decomposed into explicit inef-
ficiencies uij (positive by definition) and all other production characteristics vij, so that
εij = −uij + vij. This residual structure mirrors classic SFA.
The classic framework also assumes random assignment of practices to farms. As we
have already argued, nothing like random assignment happens in reality. A farm instead
chooses optimally from the menu of practices specified in the AEP regulation, based on
the manager’s assessment of how profitable each practice is likely to be. Farm i’s selection
of practice j is driven by the expected-profit model
piij = z
′
iγj + δuij + ηij
where zi is a vector of observed profitability factors, and ηij are unobserved profitability
factors. From our perspective as researchers, we observe the AEP choice j and the result-
ing output yij, but not the manager’s set of J intermediate expected-profit calculations
piij. These latent judgments, however, are the key drivers of the two outcomes we can
observe: uptake and output.
So far, this setting is much like a classic two-stage selection model. The fly in the
ointment is the presence of efficiency considerations in the selection step. Naïvely ignoring
this endogeneity would incorrectly attribute efficiencies to the policy menu that actually
arise from the farm’s choice of practices that best suit its characteristics.
To frame the issue in likelihood terms, suppose we observe farm i implementing AEP
practice mi = j and producing yi = yij. Denote the vector of J inefficiencies that farm
i incurs under the menu of AEP policies as ui. From our perspective as researchers, the
6
likelihood f (yi,mi) of this occurring is
f (yi,mi = j) = Eui [f (yi,mi = j|ui)]
= Eui [f (yi|mi = j, ui) f (mi = j|ui)]
= Eui [f (vij|mi = j, ui) f (mi = j|ui)]
=
∫
RJ+
f (vij|mi = j, ui) f (mi = j|ui) dF (ui)
This likelihood provides correct productivity inferences in the presence of inefficiency-
based endogeneity.
When likelihoods like this one entail a complex relationship among unobservables,
the empirical literature often makes simplifying assumptions to maintain tractability.
Unfortunately, we cannot make any of the usual ones without abandoning key features
of the AEP setting. One common simplification is that mi and vij are independent, i.e.,
that adoption is random with respect to non-inefficiency unobservables. This assumption
is effectively random assignment, and collapses the model back to SFA. But, in reality,
the unobserved factors driving output for farm i under practice j are almost assuredly
similar to the ones that led the farm to adopt it in the first place.
Another standard simplification is that the inefficiencies are all independent, an as-
sumption that conveniently reduces dF (ui) to a product of likelihoods. However, an AEP
policy menu typically implicates common farm operations, and so the elements of ui are
likely to be correlated instead. Indeed, one of the practices in the Finnish policy menu is
a combination of two others, guaranteeing correlation almost automatically.
We can maintain tractability while preserving the requisite correlations by placing
additional structure on the unobservables. In the output equation, we implement a com-
mon SFA-style normal/half-normal form for εij. That is, the conditional density of the
production unobservables vij is normal
vij|mi = j, vij ∼ N
(
0, σ2vj
)
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and the unconditional density of inefficiencies ui is half-normal
ui ∼ N+ (0,Σu)
Importantly, unlike standard SFA, the distribution of ui has an unrestricted covariance
matrix Σu.4
To aid in interpreting estimates, it is worthwhile to note the units of the f (vij|mi = j, ui)
and f (ui) distributions. The units of the production equation are the units of yij: log t
of grain output in our case. As a result, x′itβ, uit, and vit also have units of log t. The
conditional value vij|mi = j, ui can be written as a difference in logs
vij = yij −
(
x′ijβ − uij
)
and so small values of vij can also be interpreted as farm i’s percentage distance from
frontier j. Indeed, a common SFA interpretation of f (vij|mi = j, ui) is a “distribution of
percent deviations.” However, the same interpretation is not valid for uij here, because
we do not analogously perform the reverse conditioning. That is, we are intentionally not
modeling f (uij|mi = j, vij), which would provide the same percent-distance interpretation
for small values of uij. We hence have nothing to say about that distribution. We are
instead modeling f (uij) unconditionally, and so its units are simply log t of output.5 In
fact, because log t is always a valid unit of comparison in this context, we discuss all
productivity consequences in those terms.
In the selection equation, we use a standard Gumbel distribution for the unobserved
profitability factors ηij:
ηij|ui ∼ GEV
(
0, σ2η, 1
)
4Standard multivariate SFA arises when Σ1/2u is diagonal.
5Unconditional uij also provides more useful input to the selection equation. Because adoption is
based on profit levels, other level variables are appropriate predictors for that equation, rather than
percent changes that have no scale.
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Figure 1: Stochastic frontier with endogeneity (base group case)
This yields a logit probability for the adoption of practice j:
f (mi = j|ui) = exp (z
′
iγj + δuij)
1 +
∑J−1
j′=1 exp (z
′
iγj′ + δuij′)
We normalize the γj parameters relative to the Jth practice, and the shape parameter σ2η
to 1.
With first-stage logit probabilities inserted, the likelihood takes the slightly friendlier
form
f (yi,mi = j) =
∫
RJ+
[
1
σvj
φ
(
yi − x′ijβj + uij
σvj
)][
exp (z′iγj + δuij)
1 +
∑J−1
j′=1 exp (z
′
iγj′ + δuij′)
]
dF (ui)
But, this expression is still much more complex than the SFA likelihood, which is actually
closed-form:
f (yi,mi = j) =
[
1
σvj
φ
(
yi − x′ijβj + uij
σvj
)]
·
[
1
σuj
φ (uij/σuj)
Φ (uij/σuj)
]
Comparing the two reveals a new tractability issue stemming from ui’s flexible covariance.
Namely, the integral over RJ+ has potentially high dimension (J = 4 in our case), and
such integrals are difficult to evaluate numerically. This is a nuisance problem for the
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policy analysis, but failing to address it results in estimates that are overly contaminated
with approximation error. As we note Section 4, this endogeneity correction requires a
fairly large sample size to overcome its small-sample bias, and we do not need to return
hard-won gains in statistical accuracy by injecting a major source of numerical bias. We
discuss two integration algorithms in Appendix A, and implement the one that exhibits
less error.
With regard to identification, the most important quantities are the first two moments
of uij, because those attributes feed into standard efficiency indexes. We thus forego
causal interpretations of β, γ, and δ here. If those interpretations are needed in other
applications, it is certainly possible to extend this method to incorporate them.
For similar reasons, the potential decision-theoretic downsides of the selection spec-
ification (e.g., the independence of irrelevant alternatives) do not particularly concern
us. Again, we make no attempt here to causally interpret γ or δ, or the tradeoffs they
imply. For our purposes, the only role of the selection stage is to carve out an exogenous
slice of the total variation in adoption decisions, one that can re-condition the production
stage into something approximating random assignment. The success of this undertaking
depends primarily on the selection equation’s nonparametric features (e.g., strong and ex-
ogenous instruments), not its parametric ones (e.g., logit vs. probit structure) (Matzkin,
2007).
4 Finite-Sample Behavior
Because the model above is highly nonlinear, we conduct a brief simulation study to
get intuition about its finite-sample properties. Of course, when the model is correctly
specified and the sampling process is random, the CLT guarantees that the maximum-
likelihood estimators are consistent and asymptotically normal. But, the requirement for
employing the CLT (I →∞) provides little guidance on whether it actually holds in our
context. We thus investigate the behavior of a toy calibration in sample sizes frequently
encountered in empirical work: I = 100 and I = 1000 observations.
This example uses J = 2 options, a single-input production stage, and a single-
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instrument profit stage. Hence, x and z are 2× 1 vectors (including a constant in each).
The vectors in an (x, z) pair are drawn disjointly, making the calibration nonparamet-
rically identified by construction. The error variances are set so that about half of the
variation in each equation comes from the observables, and half from the unobservables.
Finally, the elements of ui are uncorrelated. These would be very favorable circumstances
to find in a real application, in our view.
Table 1: Means, standard deviations, and standard skews of the simulated sampling
distribution.
I = 100 I = 1000
True Mean Std. Dev. Std. Skew Mean Std. Dev. Std. Skew
β11 0.25 0.24 0.33 0.30 0.21 0.15 -0.07
β12 1.00 1.00 0.13 -0.01 1.00 0.04 -0.02
σv1 0.38 0.34 0.13 -0.31 0.39 0.05 -0.19
β21 0.50 0.52 0.21 0.14 0.49 0.07 0.10
β22 0.75 0.75 0.11 -0.13 0.75 0.03 0.03
σv2 0.22 0.18 0.08 0.22 0.22 0.03 0.03
γ21 0.19 0.80 8.31 1.91 0.19 1.31 0.87
γ22 -0.19 -1.00 3.67 -5.23 -0.26 0.22 -3.36
δ 0.80 8.90 90.74 5.42 0.64 7.50 4.07
σu11 0.45 0.64 0.50 2.44 0.68 0.32 1.56
σu22 0.32 0.40 0.23 0.79 0.40 0.14 1.59
σu12 0.00 -0.42 0.67 -1.67 -0.34 0.49 -1.93
Table 1 compares the true parameter values to the first three moments of their sim-
ulated sampling distributions. For each value of I, we simulated one thousand datasets.
The second-stage β estimators appear to be centered fairly well at the correct value, as
the CLT would predict. However, their standard deviations are quite large when I = 100,
a finding corroborated the spread of their histograms in Figure 2. These estimators are
thus marginally trustworthy when I = 100, but fairly robust when I = 1000.
The first-stage γ and δ estimators behave quite poorly when I = 100, indicating
that the CLT does not yet apply. The center of γ is off by a factor of four, and the
standard deviation is multiple times the center.6 Overall, convergence is much slower
in the selection equation: the center moves in the correct direction by I = 1000, but
the standard deviation is still large. The sampling distribution of δ, which is almost
6The I = 100 histograms in Figure 3 are actually truncated to the range of the I = 1000 histograms,
because a meaningful amount of the I = 100 density lies more than five standard deviations from the
mean.
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completely flat when I = 100, starts to become more defined by I = 1000. Even so,
it is still about 20% too low, and retains very high spread. The γ estimators are thus
reasonably robust when I = 1000, but the δ estimator is still not very reliable.
Figure 2: Simulated sampling distributions of β (production equation).
The σv estimators appear to be trustworthy by I = 100 at first glance. However, their
nearly-correct central values belie a double peak in their sampling distributions, a feature
evident only from the histograms in Figure 4. Of course, the CLT permits no bimodality,
and so these estimators are actually quite poor. However, they are once again reliable by
I = 1000.
The Σu estimators converge slowly, and frequently uncover spurious correlation be-
tween the inefficiencies. The histogram of the off-diagonal covariance element in Figure 5
reveals a correct modal estimate near 0, accompanied by a long left tail. This skew per-
sists even by I = 1000, a feature at odds with the symmetric distribution predicted by
the CLT. Thus, this estimator is questionable even by I = 1000.
To summarize, β, γ, and σv are reasonably well-behaved by I = 1000, but δ and Σu are
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not. This finding is unfortunate, because addressing the endogeneity of ui requires reliable
estimates of Σu and δ. This slow convergence occurs in nearly ideal conditions: the toy
calibration has no specification error, single-variable equations, guaranteed nonparametric
identification, and about half of its outcome variation explained by observables.
Figure 3: Simulated sampling distributions of γ and δ (selection equation).
Figure 4: Simulated sampling distributions of σv (unobserved production characteristics).
The practicalities of the CLT thus appear front and center when applying this endo-
geneity correction. The method is very much a large-sample one: even if the model is
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perfectly specified, estimates with samples of only hundreds are probably unreliable. Our
application contains about I = 5000 observations and generates mostly precise estimates,
giving us more confidence about its asymptotics.
Figure 5: Simulated sampling distributions of σu (unobserved inefficiencies).
5 Data
Our micro-level farm data come from two Finnish registry sources. The first is the
database “Statistics on the Finances of Agricultural and Forestry Enterprises” maintained
by Statistics Finland. It consists of a detailed yearly input/output survey at the farm
level, as well as tax-registry records on incomes, expenses, assets, and liabilities. The
survey is a rolling sample of farms interviewed for two consecutive years, making our final
dataset a repeated cross-section.
Production variables are almost always recorded as revenues and expenditures. We
back out the underlying quantities by referring to price indexes from the “Yearbook of
Farm Statistics” and the “Producer Prices of Agricultural Products,” both published by
14
Table 2: “Additional measures” enacted during second and third AEP periods.
Policy Number Second Period (2000-2006) Third Period (2007-2014)
1 More accurate fertilization Reduced fertilization
2 - More accurate nitrogen fertiliza-
tion on arable crops
3 Plant cover in winter and reduced
tillage
Plant cover in winter and reduced
tillage
4 Biodiversity on farms Plant cover in winter
5 Reduction in ammonia emissions Intensified plant cover in winter
6 Improving the welfare of animals Crop diversification
7 Treatment of washing water from
milking rooms
Extensive grassland production
8 More accurate follow up of nutri-
ents
Extensive grassland production,
region C
9 Measuring soluble nitrogen Spreading of manure during the
growing season
10 Organic cover in weed control Nutrient balance
11 Catchment of manure gases Cultivation of catch plants
12 - More accurate nitrogen fertiliza-
tion of horticultural crops
13 - Use of mulch in perennial horti-
cultural crops
14 - Use of pest monitoring methods
Note: The official policy numbers of some practices changed between AEP periods.
the Information Centre of the Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry.
AEP participation is recorded in the database “Farm Accounting and Income Statis-
tics” maintained by Finland’s Agency for Rural Affairs. This identifies each farm’s land
enrollments, and the subsidies paid.
Finland finances its AEPs jointly with the EU. The first policy period (1995-1999),
which immediately followed Finland’s entry into the EU, largely consisted of flat region-
and crop-specific basic payments for a few practices. It was subsequently revised in
conjunction with the Agenda 2000 CAP reform. The resulting second period (2000-2006)
introduced more flexibility through a wider menu of “additional” and “special” measures.
In 2003, the Fischler reform fundamentally changed the CAP, ushering in a third policy
period (2007-2014). This rather substantial amendment increased Finland’s AEP budget,
and again altered the menu of eligible practices.
The “Statistics on the Finances of Agricultural and Forestry Enterprises” database has
partial coverage of the second AEP period, and full coverage of the third. Table 2 lists the
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“additional measures” in effect during each. Although some policy overlap exists, many
new measures were introduced in the third period, and some of the second-period ones
were refined or discarded. The sheer number of changes leads us to treat the third period
as a policy break, and so we investigate it in isolation. With this focus, we can estimate
efficiency relationships without developing an ancillary control strategy for differences in
policy implementation.
A few statistics illuminate the main differences between the two periods. Figure 6
presents the time series of payments to basic, additional, and special measures. Finland
has always subsidized more than EUR 200 M of basic measures, but a persistent jump
in subsides of additional, and to a lesser extent, special measures occurred at the start
of the third period. Figures 7 and 8 list the average land areas enrolled in each practice,
by period. The upsurge in payments is reflected in the land enrollments as well, with
widespread adoption of accurate nitrogen application (practice 2) and winter cover crops
/ reduced tillage (practice 3). Of course, farms were not limited to one practice; Figures 9
and 10 present the same period averages by combination of practices. Practices 2 and 3
were most often used, either in isolation or in conjunction with other practices.
Figure 6: AEP spending, second and third AEP periods.
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Figure 7: Average annual land area enrolled in “additional measures,” second AEP period.
Figure 8: Average annual land area enrolled in “additional measures,” third AEP period.
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Figure 9: Average annual land area enrolled in “additional measure” combinations, second
AEP period.
Figure 10: Average annual land area enrolled in “additional measure” combinations, third
AEP period.
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Because these two practices are adopted at a much higher rate than the others, we
investigate an AEP menu of practice 2 alone, practice 3 alone, and the combined 2 & 3
practice. This leaves us with enough farms in each group to generate sufficient variation in
adoption. We compare them all to a baseline group that did not enroll in any additional
measures, one third of which did not enroll in even the basic program. We thus evaluate
J = 4 options, indexing them by popularity of the practice: j = 1 for practice 3, j = 2
for practice 2, j = 3 for practice 2 & 3, and j = 4 for baseline non-adopters.
Figure 11: Finnish subsidy regions within the study area.
Support region
A
B
C1
C2
Table 3 summarizes the data.7 The production equation includes the primary inputs
land, fertilizer, machinery, and fuel.8 The remaining variables are geographic and temporal
frontier shifters. Finnish agricultural subsidies vary over seven “support regions” drawn
to local climates. We focus on the four regions A-C2 (see Figure 11), an area containing
98% of Finland’s grain production.9 Because the Baltic Sea can induce microclimates, we
include an indicator of whether the farm sits near it. We capture additional climate and
weather variability with average temperature, precipitation, and growing-season length.
7Complete registry data for 2014 had not been released at the time of this analysis.
8Labor is omitted because most Finnish farms do not employ workers outside the family.
9Farms in the other three regions are located in the far north (partly above the Arctic Circle), and
face substantially different growing conditions than rest of the country.
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The selection equation includes instruments for selection bias. First, we include at-
tributes of the farm and its management. We proxy managerial experience with the
manager’s age. We proxy financial health with a farm’s debt-to-asset ratio, and the sub-
sidy payments it receives under the EU CAP and Less-Favoured Area (LFA) programs.
We conjecture that financially-secure farms are more likely adopt AEPs because they can
better absorb any unforeseen profit shock associated with the process changes.
We also include average adoption rates at the municipality level. Because municipali-
ties are much smaller than support regions, these averages capture a shared local rationale
for choosing specific practices. As a result, they correlate reasonably well with farm-level
adoption decisions. At the same time, municipal-level adoption rates probably do not
enter an individual farm’s output decision. Hence, they are candidates for strong and
exogenous instruments.
Farms adopting practice 3 tend to be larger, more input-intensive, and more highly
subsidized through CAP and LFA. They are also more likely to be found in the southern
regions A and B. The size and input use of farms adopting practice 2 generally fall between
those adopting practice 3 and the non-adopters. These farms are more concentrated in
the more northern regions C1 and C2. Like those adopting practice 3, adopters of the
combined practice tend to be larger farms, but they are more evenly distributed across
support regions. Finally, non-adopters are found primarily in regions B-C2, and are
concentrated most highly in C1. They receive lower EU subsidies (likely due to their
smaller size), are less indebted, and are more likely to be found in municipalities with
higher rates of non-adoption.
6 Results
To highlight the importance of the endogeneity correction, we begin with reduced-form
estimates of each decision stage: log-linear and SFA models of production, and multino-
mial logit models of adoption. We follow the reduced form results with the full set of
endogeneity-corrected second-stage results, and finally consider these in light of the fist
stage.
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Table 4: Pooled log-linear and SFA estimates.
Log-Linear SFA
(I) (II) (I) (II)
Constant 10.893 11.337 7.413 7.719
Land 0.825 0.842 0.887 0.895
Fertilizer 0.096 0.094 0.073 0.071
Machinery -0.005 -0.003 0.001 0.001
Fuel 0.021 0.021 0.025 0.025
2008 -0.164 -0.171 -0.061 -0.065
2009 -0.015 -0.013 0.039 0.040
2010 -0.087 -0.079 -0.057 -0.052
2011 0.069 0.077 0.050 0.050
2012 -0.103 -0.099 -0.077 -0.083
2013 -0.299 -0.288 -0.201 -0.186
Region B 0.160 0.163 0.044 0.037
Region C1 -0.028 -0.089 -0.102 -0.139
Region C2 -0.101 -0.174 -0.173 -0.219
Temperature -2.366 -2.439 -1.435 -1.496
Precipitation -0.067 -0.064 -0.007 0.002
Growing Season -0.778 -0.816 -0.473 -0.490
Baltic 0.092 0.087 0.098 0.092
Practice 3 -0.177 -0.115
Practice 2 -0.079 -0.078
Practice 2 & 3 -0.046 0.006
σv 0.205 0.202
σu 0.925 0.924
R2 0.609 0.611
Bold: significant at 5%. Italics: significant at 10%.
In the pooled log-linear estimates in Table 4, each of the primary inputs has the
expected sign (except machinery, which is insignificant). Unsurprisingly, these estimates
reveal that Finnish grain production is land- and fertilizer-intensive. More curiously,
temperature and growing-season duration both factor negatively. Nonlinearities in the
marginal effect of weather could be responsible for this result (Schlenker and Roberts,
2008). Relative to base region A, output is higher in region B and lower in regions C1
and C2. Also, farms near the Baltic Sea tend to have higher output. Relative to base
year 2007, output tends to be lower over the rest of the policy period.
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Including practice indicators does not materially change any of the pooled results. But,
the large coefficients on these indicators confirm that AEP choices are indeed correlated
with output, even after controlling for typical inputs. This is a sure sign of adoption
endogeneity.
The SFA estimates in Table 4 largely mirror the log-linear results. The notable excep-
tions are the coefficients on weather and growing-season duration, both of which shrink
by about 40%. The time indicators also uniformly shrink (up to 37%), and there are large
but directionally unsystematic changes in the region indicators (decreases up to 73%, in-
creases up to 264%). SFA’s identifying restriction thus reclassifies many regional, time,
and weather effects as outright inefficiency. And, those inefficiencies are relatively large:
the estimated standard deviation of ui is 0.558 log t. A simple inefficiency index, the
mean inefficiency E (ui), can be constructed from this estimate. In this case, inefficiency
averages 0.738 log t, or about 2% of pooled mean output.
Moving to the endogeneity correction, Table 5 compares the second-stage production
estimates to their reduced-form analogs by policy group. This correction does not alter the
primary input coefficients within groups very much. The group-level estimates do reveal
a large, positive, and statistically significant effect for Baltic Sea proximity, except for
farms adopting practice 3. Weather and growing-season effects also substantially expand
in magnitude, and there are large but unsystematic differences among the time and region
indicators.
Table 6: Mean inefficiency E (ui) in log t and as a percentage of mean output.
(II) (ii) (iii)
Practice 3 0.738 1% 0.768 1% 1.606 3%
Practice 2 0.738 3% 0.675 2% 2.064 10%
Practice 2 & 3 0.738 1% 0.760 1% 1.961 5%
Not Adopting 0.738 4% 0.673 3% 0.887 4%
The major differences between the reduced-form and endogeneity-corrected estimates
occur in the inefficiency decomposition. Table 6 collects the values of E (ui) implied
by the pooled SFA estimates (II), the uncorrected SFA estimates (ii), and the corrected
estimates (iii). The endogeneity correction uncovers substantially higher inefficiencies
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across the AEP menu. As a percentage of group-level mean output, inefficiency increases
from 1% to 3% for practice 3, 2% to 10% for practice 2, 1% to 5% for the combined
practice, and 3% to 4% for non-adopters. Thus, endogeneity-corrected inefficiencies for
specific AEPs are three to five times higher than their uncorrected values. A similar
increase occurs in the baseline group, though not as extreme.
Table 7: Endogeneity-corrected Σ1/2u estimates. Correlation coefficients in parentheses.
ui1 ui2 ui3 ui4
ui1 2.013
ui2 -0.585 (-0.036) 2.587
ui3 -0.544 (-0.104) -1.704 (-0.328) 2.458
ui4 -0.434 (-0.196) -0.752 (-0.235) -1.541 (-0.531) 1.112
Bold: significant at 5%. Italics: significant at 10%.
Table 7 presents the other critical aspect of the inefficiency decomposition, estimates
of Σ1/2u .10 These inefficiencies are highly correlated. The off-diagonal estimates tend to be
imprecise, but underscore the common operational issues that farms face when choosing
from this AEP menu. The bottom row of Σ1/2u shows that as opting out becomes more
efficient, there are even greater inefficiencies associated with selecting any AEP. This is
consistent with profit-maximizing behavior by non-adopters. A similar relationship occurs
when comparing practice 3 to practice 2.
We now turn to the first stage. For maximum statistical efficiency in generating
selection variation for the second stage, the multinomial logit includes all variables from
the production equation as well as the set of instruments.11 Because our main concern
lies with the instruments, we focus on their exogeneity and strength.12
With regard to strength, the reduced-form estimates in Table 8 indicate that farm
and managerial characteristics are largely unimportant to the adoption decision, with the
exception of the debt/asset ratio for adopters of practice 2 and the combined practice.
The municipal average adoption rates, on the other hand, are quite important across all
groups, and have the expected signs. For instance, farms in municipalities with higher
10For easy comparison between the corrected and uncorrected estimates of Σ1/2u , the bottom row of
Table 5 contains just its diagonal elements.
11Angrist and Pischke (2008, Section 4.6) provide a lucid rationale for this strategy, ultimately con-
cluding, “If a covariate is good enough for the second stage, it’s good enough for the first.”
12Appendix B contains the full set of first-stage estimates.
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adoption of practice 2 are less likely to adopt practice 3, as are those located in areas with
higher rates of non-adoption. Similarly, farms in municipalities with higher adoption of
practice 2 are themselves more likely to adopt practice 2. Finally, farms situated in areas
that adopt each practice separately are more likely to choose the combined practice.
Table 8: Multinomial logit (a) and endogeneity-corrected (iii) adoption instruments (point
estimates and marginal probability effects at the mean).
Practice 3 Practice 2 Practice 2 & 3
(a) (iii) (a) (iii) (a) (iii)
Manager’s Age 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.004
10 year change 1.2% 1.6% 0.1% 0.1% -2.1% -2.2%
Debts/Assets 0.244 0.243 0.089 0.089 0.098 0.096
1% change 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
CAP Subsidy -0.017 -0.015 -0.086 -0.085 -0.032 -0.032
EUR 1000 change 0.3% 0.2% -0.6% -0.3% -0.9% -1.0%
LFA Subsidy 0.062 0.061 0.113 0.113 0.082 0.082
EUR 1000 change 0.4% 0.7% 0.4% 0.3% 2.4% 2.4%
Municipal Practice 3 2.934 2.937 -1.632 -1.672 4.399 4.415
1% change 0.3% 0.4% -0.5% -0.3% 1.7% 1.5%
Municipal Practice 2 -3.789 -3.884 1.758 1.801 3.243 3.314
1% change -2.1% -2.3% 0.1% 0.1% 2.3% 2.2%
Municipal No Adoption -8.752 -8.907 -6.939 -7.303 -2.578 -2.636
1% change -2.6% -3.0% -0.2% -0.1% 0.7% -0.6%
uij -0.550 -0.550 -0.550
1 log t change -11.0% -0.4% -13.7%
Base practice is non-adopters. MNL pseudo-R2 = 0.35.
Bold: significant at 5%. Italics: significant at 10%.
Formally evaluating strength is difficult in this setting because the adoption outcome
is polychotomous, and there are no F -statistic rules of thumb for this case (Stock et al.,
2002). But, we can examine the logit’s goodness-of-fit more informally. The pseudo-R2
of the reduced form is 0.35 with the instruments and 0.24 without, and most of that
increase comes from the municipal adoption rates. Thus, the first stage likely contributes
a moderate amount of exogenous selection variation to the second stage.
To evaluate exogeneity, we include the candidate instruments in the reduced-form
production model, and test for their joint significance (estimates not reported). Except
for CAP and LFA payments, they are not jointly significant. This lingering correlation
reflects some production attributes that cannot be captured with input, geographic, or
temporal controls, but can be proxied with subsidy payments.
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With the endogeneity correction in place, we again observe a positive effect of in-
debtedness in adopting practice 2. LFA subsidies now have a positive effect across the
menu, as do CAP subsidies in practice 2 and the combined practice. Very importantly,
the instruments responsible for the most exogenous variation, municipal uptake rates, are
again large and statistically significant across groups.
The endogeneity-corrected first stage reveals yet another important driver of adoption:
the farm’s inefficiencies ui. The strongly negative estimate of δ indicates that efficient
farms are much more likely to adopt AEPs. Because these AEPs tend to reduce yield,
this selection effect explains the substantially higher inefficiencies that occur with the
correction in place. The overall outcome echoes Kumbhakar et al.’s finding that efficient
Finnish dairy farms are more likely to adopt organic practices, but that upon doing so,
they become less efficient than their non-organic peers.
7 Outliers
The finding that AEP adoption is associated with better efficiency ex ante is somewhat
disconcerting from a policymaker’s perspective. Because these three practices almost
assuredly reduce output, the welfare benefits of the AEP policy could be severely curtailed
if the more efficient farms are always the ones voluntarily restricting their yields through
their choice of levers.
In evaluating this result, it is important to remember that δ reflects an average propen-
sity not only across the menu of options, but also across farms. Consequently, its estimate
could be swayed by outliers. In our context, a small number of highly unproductive farms
could underpin most of the negative effect. One example is a “hobby farm,” an enterprise
that does not serve as a main income source but operates more like a recreational project.
It meets the “active farm” criteria for tax and AEP purposes, but the manager’s objective
is not profit maximization in the usual sense.
Our data, though highly disaggregated, are not rich enough to tease out this kind
of operational intent. We investigate the possibility more coarsely by excluding outliers.
We conjecture that the problematic farms are the ones substantially undershooting the
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frontier. We thus truncate the dataset using a median absolute deviation (MAD) criterion
on the reduced-form fitted values of εij (Hampel, 1974):
MADij = 1.483 ·median (|εˆij −median (εˆj)|)
Intuitively, an observation with a large MAD value fits the frontier spectacularly badly.
But, an important nuance arises when applying MAD in an efficiency context: because
εij contains both uij and vij, a large MAD value is not enough on its own to classify a
farm as inefficient. That distinction is an empirical question that our model can address,
however.
Our outlier criteria are four (MAD4) and three (MAD3) times the median error.13
The MAD4 and MAD3 criteria remove successively more farms: 4.4% of them under
MAD4 (reductions of 4.3%, 4.3%, 4.7%, and 4.3% in each group), and 8.9% under MAD3
(reductions of 10.2%, 7.3%, 10.1%, and 7.0% in each group).
Table 9 presents the new data means under these outlier criteria. A few characteristics
of the high-MAD farms are important. First, mean grain output rises nearly uniformly
as the criterion tightens: increases of 3.2%, 3.7%, 4.4%, and 3.5% occur in each group
under MAD4; and 3.0%, 3.3%, 4.8%, and 5.1% occur under MAD3. This indicates that
the outliers are predominantly lower-output farms. At the same time, mean input usage
almost uniformly falls, although the changes are less pronounced. Land use changes by
-0.2%, -0.5%, 0.5%, and -2.6% in each group under MAD4; and -1.6%, -1.3%, 0.0%, and
-2.0% under MAD3. Fertilizer use changes by -0.6%, 0.2%, 0.4%, -3.5% under MAD4;
and -2.9%, -0.1%, 0.1%, and -2.8% under MAD3. The simultaneous rise in mean output
and fall in mean inputs strongly suggests that our outliers are small, inefficient farms.
13If εij were distributed normally, these cutoffs would asymptotically correspond to 4 and 3 standard
deviations from the mean.
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Most of the other means in Table 9 are robust to MAD tightening, with the exception
of EU subsidy payments. Mean CAP payments change by -1.2%, -0.5%, 0.4%, and -1.8%
in each group under MAD4; and -1.0%, -1.7%, -0.8%, and -1.5% under MAD3. Mean
LFA payments change by 0.2%, -0.4%, 0.3%, and -1.1% under MAD3; and -1.0%, -1.1%,
0.2%, and -0.8% under MAD4. Thus, in addition to being small and inefficient, outlier
farms also receive higher subsidies from related EU programs.
Table 10 presents the new first-stage estimates. Interestingly, the estimate of δ rises
as the outlier criterion becomes more restrictive. Inefficiency has a small and insignificant
negative effect on adoption under MAD4, and a large and significant positive effect under
MAD3. To reiterate, the MAD3 estimate of δ is equal in magnitude to the full-sample
estimate, but opposite in sign. The more efficient farms now appear to be foregoing
yield-reducing AEPs, a much better welfare outcome.
As Table 11 shows, this inversion of δ also has implications for the second stage. Most
critically, σu and σv fall almost uniformly. This result is not facially surprising, because the
MAD procedure eliminates outliers rather than central observations. But, the magnitude
of this decline is quite remarkable.
Table 12 collects the implied values of E (ui). As a percentage of (full-sample) group-
level mean output, inefficiency falls from 3% to 1% for practice 3, 10% to 2% for practice
2, 5% to 1% for the combined practice, and 3% to 2% for non-adopters. These are much
more favorable inefficiency levels. Moreover, most of this change occurs during the first
trimming of the sample with MAD4, the lightest touch to the data.
Some primary input estimates are also affected by removing these outliers. For exam-
ple, land’s elasticity falls by nearly 0.07 for practice 3, and rises by 0.08 for non-adopters.
Temperature and growing-season effects tend to shrink toward 0. Large realignments also
occur in the time and geographic indicators, particularly for farms adopting practice 2.
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Table 12: Mean inefficiency E (ui) in log t and as a percentage of full-sample mean output.
(iii) MAD4 MAD3
Practice 3 1.606 3% 0.549 1% 0.490 1%
Practice 2 2.064 10% 0.506 2% 0.423 2%
Practice 2 & 3 1.961 5% 0.427 1% 0.400 1%
Not Adopting 0.887 4% 0.481 3% 0.361 2%
Table 13: Σ1/2u estimates under the full sample (top), MAD4 (middle), and MAD3 (bot-
tom). Correlation coefficients in parentheses.
ui1 ui2 ui3 ui4
ui1
2.013
0.688
0.615
ui2
-0.585 (-0.037) 2.587
0.097 (0.074) 0.634
0.034 (-0.050) 0.530
ui3
-0.544 (-0.104) -1.704 (-0.328) 2.458
0.089 (0.059) -0.130 (-0.161) 0.660
0.371 (0.507) -0.102 (-0.189) 0.501
ui4
-0.434 (-0.196) -0.752 (-0.236) -1.541 (-0.531) 1.112
0.177* (0.246) -0.086* (-0.131) -0.166 (-0.244) 0.603*
0.087 (0.120) 0.001 (0.003) -0.023 (-0.045) 0.453
Bold: significant at 5%. Italics: significant at 10%.
*Cholesky decomposition of the inverse Hessian is numerically unstable.
Table 13 presents new estimates of the correlation matrix Σ1/2u . Like the diagonal
variances, the off-diagonal covariances also shrink. Most of them retain the same sign,
although the correlation between practice 3 and non-adoption uniformly switches sign.
Importantly, even under MAD3, some of these correlations remain large and statisti-
cally significant. This indicates that the sources of inefficiency are not themselves outlier
artifacts.
This second analysis refines our initial assessment of Finland’s AEP policy. As that
policy was probably envisioned, the average efficient farm should not voluntarily sacrifice
its efficiency by enrolling in yield-reducing AEPs. That design standard has been met
according to the MAD3 analysis, but not the full-cohort analysis. The discrepancy rests
with a group of exceedingly inefficient farms. Although that group comprises only about
10% of the sample, their actions are odd enough to make the whole grain sector appear
more inefficient, and to send conflicting signals about policy efficacy.
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8 Discussion
After correcting for adoption endogeneity, we find radically different productivity con-
sequences for AEPs in the Finnish grain sector. Compared to standard SFA, average
inefficiencies are more than twice as large with the correction in place. This rather sober-
ing result has immediate policy implications. Indeed, many decentralized regulations
besides AEPs entail voluntary choices from a menu of options, and failing to account for
the adoption step can potentially overstate the welfare benefits of those policies, too.
We also find that outliers can significantly distort efficiency estimates. The outliers in
our farm sample actually hold enough sway to blur our conclusions about policy efficacy.
Eliminating them certainly improves the welfare picture, but it is not clear whether the
trimmed cohort represents the sector as accurately. These complications are probably
rather extreme, but they underscore the importance of checking for outliers as a matter
of course during efficiency analysis.
Our results also inform AEP design guidelines. To the extent that efficient farms
are indeed more likely to enroll in yield-reducing AEPs, the efficiency losses from those
policies may be higher than originally envisioned. Consequently, more funding may be
needed to compensate the increased costs that farms will actually face. Also, managers of
less-efficient farms may benefit from better training on implementation, as a way to lower
the barriers to adoption. With regard to Finland specifically, our results can rationalize
the near-universal uptake of basic measures, but more limited use of additional and special
measures. Subsidies for the latter probably do not cover a typical farm’s potential decline
in productivity.
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Appendix A Numerical Integration
Numerical integration of high-dimensional integrals suffers from rather severe tractability
issues (Geweke, 1996). We discuss two integration algorithms below, one that is familiar
to econometricians and one that is perhaps less well-known. They exhibit very different
degrees of approximation error in our model.
The first is an integration-by-simulation algorithm based on the Geweke-Hajivassiliou-
Keane (GHK) simulator (Keane, 1994). This involves sampling from an easier, related
distribution g (ui) – the multivariate normal in our case – and mapping those samples to
f (ui). LettingM (ui) denote the integrand of the likelihood, the relationship that enables
the simulator is the identity
∫
RJ+
M (ui) dF (ui) =
∫
RJ
M (ui)
f (ui)
g (ui)
g (ui) dui
By computing each simulation’s importance weight w (ui) = f(ui)g(ui) , the integral can be
approximated with S simulations from g (ui):
∫
RJ+
M (ui) dF (ui) '
1
S
∑S
s=1 M (u
s
i )w (u
s
i )
1
S
∑S
s=1w (u
s
i )
The numerator approximates the likelihood for an untruncated, joint-normal distribution,
and the denominator approximates the truncation probability.
Though easy to implement, GHK exhibits unacceptable approximation error in our
model. In explorations using the toy calibration from Section 4, we find that obtaining two
digits of integration accuracy requires S ≈ 104 points. Because integration-by-simulation
relies on convergence in probability, any further improvements come at a
√
S rate at
best. This implies that an exponentially-larger number of simulations would be needed to
achieve each additional digit of accuracy, a quintessential curse-of-dimensionality result.
The finding bodes particularly ill for our application: the dataset has I = 103 to 104 ob-
servations, each of which entails an integration at every iteration of a maximum-likelihood
search.
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Instead, we perform the integration using a sparse grid, a set of multidimensional
quadrature points and associated scalar weights {ωsi , qsi }Ss=1. Sparse grids are constructed
under a different convergence criterion that reduces integration error much faster (Ger-
stner and Griebel, 1998). As a result, a smaller number of points S is needed to achieve
the same level of precision. The functional form of the approximation is like a weighted
average: ∫
RJ+
M (ui) dF (ui) '
S∑
s=1
M (ωsi ) f (ω
s
i ) q
s
i
In experiments with the toy calibration, we obtain 3 to 4 digits of accuracy with a grid
of S ≈ 102 points, a far more tractable option.
These grids are defined over simple regions of the real domain, and the quadrature
points must be analytically mapped to more complicated regions of interest like ours.
We start from the Gauss-Legendre grid, which approximates integration over the [−1, 1]J
hypercube, and map its points to RJ+ while imputing the correct correlation structure.
To frame the procedure in better-known terms, this translation treats each point ωsi
in the original grid as a “draw from a uniform distribution” ω¯si , to which the “inverse
distribution function” F−1 (ω¯si ) is applied. The result is analogous to a “draw from the
target distribution” usi .
The procedure involves two major domain transformations:
1. The original grid point ωsi in [−1, 1]J is linearly translated to a point ω¯si in the
uniform-distribution domain [0, 1]J .
2. The uniform point ω¯si is translated to F (usi ). Because this distribution has arbitrary
correlation as well as truncation, the usi vector must be composed sequentially, with
each element accounting for the correlation previously imposed.
(a) For the jth element in the vector, an intermediate scalar draw u¯sij is taken from
a standard univariate truncated-normal distribution, using the uniform scalar
ω¯sij from step 1. To capture the correlation in elements up to the jth, the lower
truncation bound of u¯sij is set to the z-score
0−∑j−1
j′=1 σujj′ u¯
s
ij′
σujj
, where σujj′ denotes
the (j, j′) element of the correlation matrix Σ1/2u .
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(b) Repeating (a) for all J elements results in a correlated, truncated standard
draw u¯si . This is translated into a draw from N+ (0, Σu) through the affine
transformation usi = 0 +
∑1/2
u u¯
s
i .
Very importantly, the change-of-variable formula for integration must be applied in par-
allel with every transformation of the grid point. This ensures that the Gauss-Legendre
integrand f (ωi) dωi over [−1, 1]J corresponds to the multivariate truncated-normal inte-
grand f (ui) dui over RJ+.
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Appendix B First-Stage Estimates
Table 14: Multinomial logit (a) and endogeneity-corrected (iii) adoption estimates (con-
tinues Table 8).
Practice 3 Practice 2 Practice 2 & 3
(a) (iii) (a) (iii) (a) (iii)
Manager’s Age 0.001 0.002 -0.001 0.000 -0.004 -0.004
Debts/Assets 0.244 0.243 0.089 0.089 0.098 0.096
CAP Subsidy -0.017 -0.015 -0.086 -0.085 -0.032 -0.032
LFA Subsidy 0.062 0.061 0.113 0.113 0.082 0.082
Municipal Practice 3 2.934 2.937 -1.632 -1.672 4.399 4.415
Municipal Practice 2 -3.789 -3.884 1.758 1.801 3.243 3.314
Municipal No Adoption -8.752 -8.907 -6.939 -7.303 -2.578 -2.636
uij -0.550 -0.550 -0.550
Constant 11.228 6.047 -2.291 -6.735 5.893 2.006
Land 1.081 1.088 0.276 0.281 0.591 0.598
Fertilizer 0.006 0.006 -0.038 -0.040 0.131 0.132
Machinery 0.221 0.223 0.069 0.068 0.193 0.192
Fuel 0.113 0.112 0.086 0.085 0.189 0.190
2008 -0.231 -0.114 0.017 0.130 -0.257 -0.169
2009 -0.097 -0.083 -0.045 -0.041 -0.027 -0.019
2010 0.533 0.454 0.071 0.014 0.515 0.437
2011 0.644 0.529 -0.120 -0.198 0.671 0.579
2012 0.594 0.631 0.431 0.456 0.531 0.566
2013 0.323 0.267 -0.480 -0.541 0.013 -0.069
Subsidy region 2 -0.746 -0.707 -1.584 -1.557 -1.016 -0.960
Subsidy region 3 -0.467 -0.362 -1.762 -1.696 -1.787 -1.699
Subsidy region 4 -1.424 -1.292 -1.926 -1.828 -1.991 -1.897
Temperature -2.149 -0.995 2.226 3.148 0.074 0.947
Precipitation -0.777 -0.745 -0.225 -0.198 -0.801 -0.781
Growing Season -1.629 -1.215 -0.284 0.035 -2.209 -1.902
Baltic 0.141 0.160 0.073 0.069 0.169 0.182
Bold: significant at 5%. Italics: significant at 10%.
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